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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The duty to monitor sits at the crossroads between the two fun-
damental fiduciary duties of corporations law: the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty. Much of corporations law focuses on what direc-
tors should do when they make decisions for the corporation. The du-
ty of care tells them to act with “the care of an ordinarily prudent 
person in the same or similar circumstances.”1 The duty of loyalty 
tells them to “exercise [their] institutional power . . . in a good-faith 
effort to advance the interests of the company.”2 Both duties tell di-
rectors to protect the interests of the corporation.  
 The difficult question is whether the board breaches any of its fi-
duciary duties when its inattention or inaction leads to harm to the 
corporation. The duty to monitor addresses this question by imposing 
liability on directors for failing to respond to signs of wrongdoing, il-
legality, or other harmful activities. Because the duty to monitor im-
poses liability based on what the board failed to do, it is difficult to 
define the scope of liability.3 A natural dilemma exists in evaluating 
                                                                                                                  
 * Associate Professor of Law and Director, The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center 
on Corporate Governance, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, NY. E-mail: 
epan@yu.edu. I am grateful for helpful comments from Steven Davidoff, Arthur Jacobson, 
Maggie Lemos, Uriel Procaccia, Stewart Sterk, Matteo Tonello, Verity Winship, and 
Charles Yablon and thank Val Myteberi and Arielle Katzman for their invaluable research 
assistance. 
 1. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 240 (3d ed. 2009); see also REVISED
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1985); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994). 
 2. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 295. 
 3. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(describing the duty to monitor as “a board decision that results in a loss because that deci-
sion was ill advised or ‘negligent’ ” and “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in cir-
cumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss”). 
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a director’s level of care or loyalty based purely on the fact that there 
was an absence of action by such director. Unless the director’s fail-
ure to act was the product of deliberation (which takes the matter 
outside of the scope of the duty to monitor), no records, witnesses, or 
other readily available pieces of evidence will be available to inform a 
court whether the board’s failure to act was an act of carelessness or 
disloyalty. As a result, when adjudicating claims alleging inattention 
or inaction by a board, a court faces the uncomfortable task of exer-
cising its own independent judgment that the board should have done 
something instead of remaining still and silent.  
 At the same time, the duty to monitor serves as the best means 
the law has to ensure that directors are attentive and vigilant 
against the occurrence of harm to the corporation. To the extent we 
believe and expect a board to perform a substantial role in managing 
the corporation—as opposed to serving merely as review and approv-
al bodies for the wants and wishes of officers—it is appropriate to 
hold boards to a high monitoring standard. Ideally, little should af-
fect the corporation without the knowledge, consent, or consideration 
of the board.  
 This Article criticizes the Delaware doctrine of the duty to moni-
tor.4 Delaware courts have defined too narrowly the scope of the duty 
and have made it undesirably difficult for plaintiffs to bring forward 
duty to monitor claims. As it is currently conceived, the duty to moni-
tor rewards ignorance and passivity by directors, imposing little obli-
gation on them to take an active interest in the corporation’s busi-
ness. By limiting the scope of the duty only to cases of wrongdoing 
and illegality, the doctrine encourages directors to focus on legal 
compliance at the expense of business performance—an odd result 
when boards are usually stocked with persons touted for their busi-
ness, not legal, acumen. The focus on legal compliance also encour-
ages government authorities to criminalize a broader scope of corpo-
rate activities, as this is the only way to ensure directors follow de-
sirable corporate governance practices.  
 In addition, by requiring plaintiffs to plead a high degree of speci-
ficity as to what the directors knew of possible harm to the corpora-
tion, the doctrine incentivizes directors to avoid asking questions or 
otherwise making efforts to uncover possible red flags. Such efforts 
serve only to increase the number of occasions when directors may 
find themselves forced to act to satisfy their duty to monitor or to 
produce paper trails enabling plaintiffs to bring forward additional 
                                                                                                                  
 4. This Article focuses on the duty to monitor in Delaware in recognition of Dela-
ware’s position as the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 
(2003) (providing statistics of the most popular jurisdictions of incorporation for U.S. com-
panies). 
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duty to monitor claims. The doctrine instead encourages directors to 
rouse themselves only when red flags are thrown up by existing in-
ternal control systems, like the drunk who only looks for his lost keys 
under the street lamp because that is where the light is.  
 This Article sets forth four objections to how Delaware courts have 
defined directors’ duty to monitor. First, the Delaware doctrine is in-
consistent with the role of the board in the corporation. Boards serve 
both a monitoring and managerial role in the corporation, and the 
duty to monitor should provide the proper incentives for boards to 
fulfill this preferred role.  
 Second, the Delaware doctrine is wrong to excuse boards from 
monitoring business risk. Rather, boards should be held responsible 
for business as well as legal outcomes, and courts should shift the 
burden onto them to show that they have made the effort to be in-
formed and to respond to developments producing such outcomes.  
 Third, the recasting of the duty to monitor as a claim of bad faith 
conduct has imposed an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs to bring 
forward meritorious duty to monitor claims. In an attempt to respect 
the Delaware courts’ desire to cast the duty to monitor as part of the 
duty of loyalty, this Article argues that Delaware courts could ease 
the burden on plaintiffs by making clear that the definition of scien-
ter includes demonstration of recklessness and treating a director’s 
failure to monitor as a rebuttable presumption. Such changes would 
be faithful to the reasoning of Caremark while still respecting the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s conception of the duty to monitor as part 
of the good faith and loyalty framework.  
 Fourth, Delaware courts have not provided adequate guidance as to 
when the duty to monitor should apply. The current doctrine emphasiz-
es board action only in the face of a red flag but leaves ambiguous the 
board’s duty to monitor in the aftermath of a past decision. Courts 
should note that a board’s responsibility does not end at the moment of 
voting but includes ensuring that its decisions remain appropriate over 
time and in the best interests of the corporation. These changes reinforce 
the fact that Delaware courts cannot shy away from reviewing cases 
where a board’s failure to monitor results in harmful business outcomes. 
 This Article recognizes a common objection to any set of reforms 
aimed at strengthening the scope of fiduciary duties: directors enjoy 
numerous protections against personal liability. Even though indemnifi-
cation and director and officer insurance shield them from personal lia-
bility, directors face very real reputational costs if they fail to meet their 
fiduciary obligations and will look to judges for guidance regarding their 
responsibilities. Therefore, this Article concludes that expansion of the 
scope of the duty to monitor will have a real effect on directors’ behavior 
toward risk management and managerial oversight.  
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II.   THE DELAWARE DOCTRINE OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR
 In an earlier article, I analyzed in detail the cases that have given 
meaning to the duty to monitor under Delaware law—an analysis 
that this Article now builds upon to frame a series of objections to the 
doctrine.5 The four cases that have defined Delaware’s duty to moni-
tor are: Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,6 In re Care-
mark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,7 Stone v. Ritter,8 and In
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.9 Graham intro-
duced the notion that boards have a duty to act when they become 
aware of wrongdoing (i.e., red flags).10 Caremark explained why 
boards have an obligation not only to act in the face of obvious signs 
of wrongdoing but also to be informed of, and to watch for, wrongdo-
ing.11 Stone defined breach of the duty to monitor as an act of bad 
faith and therefore a breach of the duty of loyalty.12 Finally, 
Citigroup effectively has closed the door on duty to monitor claims 
pertaining to boards’ failure to monitor business risk.13
 The duty to monitor depends on two elements: what efforts the 
board must take to detect possible harm, and what types of possible 
harm require board action. The current standard for assessing what 
efforts must be taken by the board is whether the board “utterly 
fail[s] to implement any reporting or information system or controls” 
or if “having implemented such . . . system[s] or controls, consciously 
fail[s] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves 
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”14
Courts have recognized a breach of a duty to monitor only when 
board inaction or inattention leads to wrongful acts or violations of 
law.15 Courts have never found a breach of the duty to monitor in 
cases involving business harm to the corporation in the absence of 
wrongful acts or violations of the law.  
 The path by which the Delaware courts developed their under-
standing of the duty to monitor is not a straight one. In the Care-
mark decision, Chancellor Allen provided a rationale for a quite ex-
                                                                                                                  
 5. See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717 (2009). 
 6. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 7. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 8. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 9. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 10. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. 
 11. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. Hillary Sale has called Caremark “one of the most 
prominent Delaware opinions of all time.” Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good 
Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719-20 (2007). Because Chancellor William Allen’s opinion 
in Caremark remains the most complete exploration by a Delaware court of the meaning of 
the duty to monitor, duty to monitor claims are often referred to as “Caremark claims.” 
 12. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 13. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. 
 14. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 15. See, e.g., Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.  
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pansive duty to monitor—a duty that would require boards to be at-
tentive to a broad range of legal and business harms to the corpora-
tion. According to Chancellor Allen, a board’s duty to monitor stems 
from the “seriousness” of its role in the management of the corpora-
tion.16 Such a serious role logically should mean that directors bear 
ultimate responsibility for preventing harm to the corporation and 
that directors’ ignorance of, or unfamiliarity with, any such harm 
would signify a failure to meet such responsibilities. Chancellor Allen 
also believed that having monitoring systems in place was essential 
to boards meeting their supervisory and monitoring role, and that 
this obligation to continuously collect “relevant and timely infor-
mation” (and by implication, review such information) stems not only 
from a fiduciary obligation but from section 141 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law—the statutory provision stating that the 
corporation shall be managed at the direction of the board.17 Igno-
rance cannot be the natural state of the board. As a decisionmaker 
and consumer of information, the board must make efforts to be in-
formed and cannot avoid being held accountable for any develop-
ments that may affect the corporation’s performance.  
 Furthermore, in discussing the rationale for the duty to monitor, 
Chancellor Allen noted that the board’s responsibility to be informed 
was to prevent not only legal harm but also business harm.18 Boards 
must assure themselves that they have in place an information and 
reporting system that permits the board to make “informed judg-
ments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its 
business performance.”19 Thus, the duty to monitor should extend to 
harm resulting from illegal or wrongful acts and also business devel-
opments. Chancellor Allen, however, ultimately did not address in 
his decision the problem of failure to monitor business performance. 
He limited his analysis of the duty to monitor to “losses caused by 
non-compliance with applicable legal standards,” as the facts of the 
Caremark case pertained only to the failure of the board to prevent 
legal violations by employees.20 After Caremark, Delaware courts 
have declined to embrace fully Chancellor Allen’s rationale for the 
duty to monitor and instead have recognized the applicability of the 
duty to monitor in only a range of cases involving wrongdoing 
and illegality. 
 Ten years later in Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court revised the 
Caremark standard: first, by equating the duty to monitor with the 
                                                                                                                  
 16. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970. 
 17. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 18. Id. at 968-69. 
 19. Id. at 970. 
 20. Id. 
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duty of good faith;21 second, by subsuming the duty of good faith into 
the duty of loyalty22 (Chancellor Allen considered the duty to monitor 
to be part of the duty of care23);24 and third, by requiring plaintiffs 
meet a high standard of scienter to prove directors acted in bad 
faith.25 The Stone formulation of the duty to monitor standard is cap-
tured in the paragraph: 
Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for direc-
tor oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement 
any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having im-
plemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor 
or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being in-
formed of risks or problems requiring their attention. In either 
case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors 
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations. 
Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibili-
ties, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that 
fiduciary obligation in good faith.26
                                                                                                                  
 21. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 22. Id. at 369-70. 
 23. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68. 
 24. Ambiguous drafting of section 102(b)(7) and references to a duty of good faith in 
earlier Delaware cases gave the impression that good faith was either an independent fidu-
ciary duty that stood alongside the duties of care and loyalty or represented a means of 
measuring the degree of success that a fiduciary achieved in meeting her duty of care. In 
previous cases, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to recognize that the duty of good 
faith, along with the duties of care and loyalty, formed a “triad” of fiduciary duties. See, 
e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (defining a triad of fidu-
ciary duties to consist of the duty of good faith, duty of loyalty, and duty of care). The Del-
aware Supreme Court frequently re-emphasized the existence of this triad of fiduciary 
duties. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Malone v. Brin-
cat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). For many commentators, recognition of an independent 
duty of good faith was desirable in order to hold directors and officers accountable for cer-
tain acts that did not constitute classic cases of disloyalty but were so egregious that they 
should be beyond section 102(b)(7) exculpation. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Dela-
ware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) [hereinafter Sale, Delaware’s  
Good Faith].
 25. The court identified a scienter requirement to prove a breach of the duty to moni-
tor, stating “imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they 
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citing with ap-
proval Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)); see also Wood v. Baum, 953 
A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“Where, as here, directors are exculpated from liability except 
for claims based on ‘fraudulent,’ ‘illegal’ or ‘bad faith’ conduct, a plaintiff must also plead 
particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter . . . .”); Desimo-
ne v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007). In order to show scienter, plaintiffs must 
“plead particularized facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’ 
that their conduct was legally improper.” Wood, 953 A.2d at 141; see also Guttman, 823 
A.2d at 506 (“[The Caremark standard] premises liability on a showing that the directors 
were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs.”). 
 26. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
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The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision made it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to bring duty to monitor claims. The court placed the bur-
den on the plaintiff to demonstrate a director’s scienter in failing to 
act in the face of red flags. The lack of clarity from the Delaware 
courts as to how plaintiffs can meet this requirement in the absence 
of board deliberation undermined the effectiveness of the duty  
to monitor.   
 Finally, the recent Citigroup decision has narrowed the substan-
tive limits of the duty to monitor. In this case, Chancellor Chandler 
considered a shareholder derivative suit against the Citigroup board 
for failing to prevent losses incurred by the bank holding company 
from its substantial investments in mortgage-backed securities.27
These investments resulted in near catastrophic losses for Citigroup, 
producing great losses to shareholders and forcing the bank to sub-
mit to two federal government bailouts.28 The plaintiffs argued that 
the Citigroup board failed to oversee the corporation’s exposure to the 
mortgage-backed securities market and ignored several red flags that 
warned the board of the deteriorating subprime mortgage market.29
 Chancellor Chandler rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. He decided 
that a claim to hold directors responsible for failing to prevent busi-
ness harm would undermine the business judgment rule.30 The pur-
pose of the business judgment rule is “to allow corporate managers 
and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of be-
ing held personally liable if those decisions turn out poorly.”31 Chan-
cellor Chandler appears to believe that failing to monitor business 
risk is the same as deciding to assume a business risk—a question-
able assertion. Chancellor Chandler is understandably concerned 
that any evaluation by a court of the board’s responsiveness to busi-
                                                                                                                  
 27. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 28. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2008) (announcing sale of $25 
billion in preferred stock and warrants to the U.S. Treasury Department); Citigroup Inc., Annu-
al Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2008) (announcing $40 billion capital benefit provided by U.S. 
Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and Federal Deposit Corporation); see also David 
Enrich, et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup—Plan Injects $20 Billion in Fresh 
Capital, Guarantees $306 Billion in Toxic Assets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. Citigroup’s 
share price fell 86% between December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2008. On December 31, 
2004, Citigroup’s stock was trading at $48.18 per share. On December 31, 2008, Citigroup’s 
stock was trading at $6.71 per share. See, e.g., YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=C&a=11&b=31&c=2004&d=11&e=31&f=2008&g=d  
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011).     
 29. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114; see also id. at 126-27 (“The allegations in the Com-
plaint amount essentially to a claim that Citigroup suffered large losses and that there 
were certain warning signs that could or should have put defendants on notice of the busi-
ness risks related to Citigroup’s investments in subprime assets.”).  
 30. Id. at 126. 
 31. Id. at 125; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a pre-
sumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.”).  
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ness risk would mean judging the merits of the board’s actions after 
the fact.32 As he noted, courts must be careful to avoid the danger of 
hindsight bias (i.e., “the tendency for [someone] with knowledge of an 
outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome 
could have been predicted”).33 Chancellor Chandler narrowed the du-
ty to monitor by ruling that, except in the most extreme cases, which 
he left unspecified,34 a board should never be held liable for failing to 
monitor business risk.35
 Since Stone, Delaware courts have often dismissed several plaintiffs’ 
attempts to argue that directors face a substantial likelihood of personal 
liability from duty to monitor claims.36 In dismissing the claims, the 
courts have either focused on whether plaintiffs have “pled sufficient 
facts to meet the scienter requirement or, in the case of Citigroup, have 
excused the board from having any monitoring” duty.37
III.   RETHINKING THE DUTY TO MONITOR
 There are four objections to the Delaware courts’ treatment of the 
duty to monitor. First, a broader duty to monitor is crucial to enforc-
ing the board’s proper role as monitor and manager of the corpora-
tion. Implicit in the Delaware recognition of a weak duty to monitor 
is the assumption that boards do not play an active role in the man-
agement of the corporation and, therefore, should not be expected to 
have knowledge of harmful events except in the occasional cases 
where passive monitoring systems may detect such events. Such an 
assumption is inconsistent with the appropriate role of the board in 
the corporation. Boards should serve both a monitoring and manage-
rial role in the corporation, and the duty to monitor should provide 
the proper incentives for boards to fulfill this preferred role.  
 Second, Delaware courts are wrong to excuse boards from manag-
ing business risk and understanding the likelihood of harm to the 
corporation’s business. Rather, boards should be held responsible for 
business as well as legal outcomes. Courts should shift the burden 
                                                                                                                  
 32. Citigroup, 964 A.2d. at 124-26. 
 33. See id. at 124 n.50. Having the court give in to hindsight bias would make boards 
overly cautious and hypersensitive to hazardous activity, encouraging overinvestment  
in monitoring. 
 34. See id. at 126 (“In this case, plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable for 
failing to properly monitor the risk that Citigroup faced from subprime securities. While it 
may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden under some set of facts, plaintiffs in this 
case have failed to state a Caremark claim sufficient to excuse demand based on a theory 
that the directors did not fulfill their oversight obligations by failing to monitor the busi-
ness risk of the company.” (emphasis added)). 
 35. See id. at 124, 129-31. 
 36. See Pan, supra note 5, at 733-34. 
 37. See id. at 734. 
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onto directors to show that they made an effort to be informed and to 
respond to developments leading to such outcomes.  
 Third, the recasting of the duty to monitor as a claim of bad faith 
conduct imposes an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs to bring for-
ward meritorious duty to monitor claims. This Article argues that 
Delaware courts could lower the burden on plaintiffs by adopting a 
definition of scienter that includes demonstration of recklessness (or 
at least deliberate recklessness) and treating a director’s failure to 
monitor as a rebuttable presumption. Such a change would be faith-
ful to the reasoning of Caremark while still respecting the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s conception of the duty to monitor as part of the good 
faith and loyalty framework.  
 Fourth, the current doctrine leaves ambiguous the board’s duty to 
monitor in the aftermath of a past decision. Courts should note that a 
board’s responsibility does not end when it votes on an issue but in-
cludes ensuring that its decisions remain appropriate over time and 
in the best interests of the corporation. Recognizing the appropriate 
scope of the board’s responsibilities means Delaware courts cannot 
shy away from reviewing those cases where a board decision may lay 
the condition for harmful business outcomes. It is important for Del-
aware courts to clarify the boundary line between business judgment 
and failure to monitor. 
A.   Board as Monitor and Manager 
 Boards play two complementary roles. First, they monitor the per-
formance of officers. They are elected representatives of the share-
holders and responsible for the appointment of the CEO and other 
officers. They also serve as managers. They participate in the corpo-
rate decisionmaking process, working with the CEO in setting strat-
egy. Given their importance in monitoring and contributing to man-
agement, courts should have high expectations for what boards can 
and should be able to do to oversee the risks of the corporation. 
 The authority of boards is absolute. Section 141(a) of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law is representative of the general rule in U.S. 
corporation law that, “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . 
. . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
except as may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of incorpo-
ration.”38 While the law grants boards the sole power to manage the 
                                                                                                                  
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (empha-
sis added); see also N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.01 (2005).  
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corporation, boards in practice delegate most management responsi-
bility to officers.39
 If boards are not supposed to be either full-time managers or cor-
porate owners, what is their proper role? To the extent the concentra-
tion of managerial authority in the hands of a group of professional 
officers undermines shareholder value, boards must assume an active 
role in the management of the corporation, limiting the power of the 
officers. Boards should act as monitors, collecting and evaluating in-
formation about the performance of officers and the effectiveness of 
corporate strategy. Boards also must act as managers, offering advice 
concerning or, if necessary, dictating corporate strategy. These roles 
are not separable. A board cannot carry out its managerial role with-
out first collecting information about corporate operations through its 
monitoring activities. Nor can the board fulfill its monitoring role 
without having the ability to affect corporate strategy and respond to 
negative developments. 
 Agency theory and resource dependency theory explain why 
boards operate as both monitors and managers. Agency theory as-
sumes that managers, if given the opportunity, will pursue their per-
sonal interests at the expense of those of the shareholders.40 Conse-
quently, efforts must be made to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Such pressure on managers can come from external 
and internal sources. For example, the market for corporate control 
provides outside pressure on managers.41 Managerial underperfor-
                                                                                                                  
 39. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 106-08 (1986) (noting that while the board 
is supposed to supervise the entire business, the actual amount of work performed by the 
board is actually much more modest). Under Delaware law, officers are the creation of the 
board. The board appoints officers as it sees fit and gives officers their power. Even the 
chief executive officer depends on the board for her authority to conduct business on behalf 
of the corporation. Title 8, section 142 of the Delaware Code states “[e]very corporation 
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be 
stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 142 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see also Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV. A. 
13358, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995), aff’d, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (“A fundamen-
tal precept of Delaware corporation law is that it is the board of directors, and neither 
shareholders nor managers, that has ultimate responsibility for the management of the 
enterprise. Of course, given the large, complex organizations through which modern, multi-
function business corporations often operate, the law recognizes that corporate boards, 
comprised as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating less than all of their atten-
tion to that role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but may satisfy 
their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and 
plans and monitoring performance.” (internal citations omitted)); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 259 
(2008) (enumerating the benefits of delegation from the board to officers). 
 40. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740-48 (1997). 
 41. But see Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino & Laura T. Starks, Internal Monitoring 
Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2295-96 (2001) 
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mance makes a corporation more attractive to takeover attempts. 
Incentive-based compensation offers internal pressure. Awarding eq-
uity allows managers to benefit from the maximization of sharehold-
er value.42
 The most important mechanisms to address the agency problem, 
however, are those that facilitate direct monitoring of managers by 
shareholders. For example, much emphasis in recent years has been 
given to the role of institutional investors in monitoring managers.43 As 
the largest shareholders, institutional investors are in the best position 
to overcome the collective action problem and defend shareholder inter-
ests. Others have argued for better access by shareholders to proxy 
statements,44 requirements that directors receive majority support from 
                                                                                                                  
(finding that evidence does not fully support the theory that a more active takeover market 
strengthens internal control mechanisms). 
 42. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864-65 (1993) (arguing in support of awarding 
equity interests to managers as incentive devices); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Rob-
ert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 
J. FIN. ECON. 293, 306-07 (1988) (finding evidence of a positive relationship between a 
board member’s equity ownership in the firm and the market value of that firm). 
 43. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institu-
tional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991); Steven Huddart, The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value, 39 
MGMT. SCI. 1407 (1993). But very large shareholders may seek to retain for themselves 
certain rents of the corporation at the expense of other, more scattered shareholders. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corpo-
rate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 661-62 (1999); David A. Skeel, 
Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1529 (2004) (book review). Others 
have noted that many institutional investors are passive, long-term investors, having little 
interest in being active monitors of the corporation and allowing other investors to set the 
shareholder agenda. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional 
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1352-53 (1991); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on 
a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1082-84 (2008). But others view institu-
tional investors as a harmful and impatient force, pressuring executives to pursue quick 
profits and take on excessive risk. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Jay W. Lorsch & Theodore N. 
Mirvis, A Crisis is a Terrible Thing to Waste: The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act 
of 2009” is a Serious Mistake (May 12, 2009), 
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.16657.09.pdf.  
 44. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 
121, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the policy debate regarding shareholder access to 
the corporate ballot); Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule 
Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm. 
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shareholders,45 approval by shareholders of executive compensation,46
and rights for shareholders to propose charter amendments.47
 Having shareholders monitor managers, however, is problematic. 
Shareholders’ authority stems primarily from their power to elect 
members of the board, but this power is limited. Shareholders must 
rely on boards to exercise appropriate control over officers. If boards 
fail to do so, shareholders’ only recourse is to elect new directors. This 
option presumes that shareholders have alternative candidates. Of-
ten, candidates nominated by the CEO dominate board elections, and 
current rules make it expensive for shareholders to propose their own 
candidates.48 Therefore, any increase in the influence of shareholders 
over managers depends on boards’ willingness to more aggressively 
monitor the performance of officers.49 A more robust duty to monitor 
for boards helps resolve this agency problem.  
 According to resource dependency theory, directors provide valua-
ble resources to the corporation.50 Directors, who are selected for 
their skills, experience, and connections, contribute personal capital 
to the corporation whether by providing strategic advice to officers, 
identifying new business opportunities, assisting in government rela-
tions, or establishing new relationships. A board consisting of former 
regulatory officials, financial institution executives, or lawyers would 
give the corporation access to information about regulatory processes, 
to financial credit, or legal advice.51 Directors use their personal rela-
                                                                                                                  
 45. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,
96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008). 
 46. See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a 
Greater Say Over Executive Pay?: Learning from the US Experience 10-12 (Vand. Univ. L. 
Sch. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 01-6, 2001), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268992.
 47. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 865-67 (2005). 
 48. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards 
of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96 (1998). Hermalin 
and Weisbach also cite the study conducted by Harry and Linda DeAngelo finding that 
when dissident shareholders challenge the officers’ recommended directors, the sharehold-
ers only succeed in winning a board seat one-third of the time. See Harry DeAngelo & Lin-
da DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN.
ECON. 29, 30 (1989). 
 49. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313-15 (1983) (noting that the board is a lower cost mechanism to 
control management than the market for corporate control); Benjamin M. Oviatt, Agency 
and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for 
Congruent Interests, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 214 (1988). 
 50. See, e.g., Amy J. Hillman, Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Ramona L. Paetzold, The Re-
source Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition 
in Response to Environmental Change, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 235, 236 (2000). 
 51. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Regulation and the Evolution of Corpo-
rate Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 167 (2004) (stud-
ying the impact of political directors on natural gas companies between 1930 and 1998 and 
finding that such corporations add political directors for their regulatory expertise). 
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tionships, skills, and reputation to advance the corporation’s inter-
ests. Directors also draw upon their experience and expertise to make 
valuable cognitive contributions to corporate decisionmaking.52 For 
resource dependency theory to hold true, the CEO must work closely 
with the board to exploit these valuable resources. Likewise, in order 
for the board to be useful to the corporation, the board must be inti-
mately familiar with the objectives and operations of the corporation. 
This need is particularly true in situations where the director pro-
vides value to the corporation by drawing upon her experience and 
decisionmaking skills to help plan corporate strategy.53
 These theories suggest that the proper role of the board is that of 
both monitor and manager, and empirical studies have shown that 
these two roles are pursued in practice.54 Under agency theory, the 
board is valued for its ability to keep officers in check so that they 
work in the interests of shareholders. Resource dependency theory, 
on the other hand, places a premium on a board’s ability to add value 
as part of the decisionmaking and strategic planning process.  
 Two objections are commonly made to this depiction of the board 
as monitor and manager. The first objection comes from those who 
believe boards are controlled by the powerful CEO and offer little 
check on executive authority. Studies by Myles Mace and by Jay 
Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver famously depicted the board as the 
junior partner to the CEO.55 The CEO’s dominance of the board is a 
result of a variety of factors. Officers have a monopoly on inside in-
formation. Directors have to rely on the officers to keep them in-
formed. Officers are professional managers who are employed full-
time by the corporation. Directors often have a more diverse range of 
backgrounds and spend only a fraction of their time on board busi-
ness. The CEO and other officers frequently have seats on the board 
and, therefore, can exert direct control over board decisions. This 
power of the CEO over the board is frequently reflected by the fact 
that the CEO also serves as chairman of the board. Even if the board 
                                                                                                                  
 52. See Violina P. Rindova, What Corporate Boards Have to Do with Strategy: A Cog-
nitive Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 953 (1999). Rindova observes that among the many 
contributions that boards make to strategic planning, boards contribute their diverse expe-
rience which serves a valuable source of knowledge from which management can draw 
upon to make superior decisions. Id. at 960. 
 53. See Kenneth R. Andrews, Directors’ Responsibility for Corporate Strategy, 104 
HARV. BUS. REV. 30, 30-31 (1980). See generally Ari Ginsberg, Minding the Competition: 
From Mapping to Mastery, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 153 (1994); Tom Perkins, The ‘Compli-
ance’ Board, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2007, at A11 (arguing for a “guidance board” involved 
deeply in strategy, tactics, technology, and engineering reviews). 
 54. See Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Perfor-
mance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
383, 388 (2003) (describing the results of a study performed by Korn/Ferry International). 
 55. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 185-86, 188 (1971); JAY W.
LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S COR-
PORATE BOARDS (1989). 
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is not composed of corporate insiders, the CEO often controls the 
nomination of new directors, making it more likely that the board 
will be compliant and receptive to the views of the CEO. Not surpris-
ingly, this image of the board shaped by Mace, Lorsch and MacIver, 
and others has encouraged the belief that directors are incapable and 
ill-equipped to provide effective oversight of officers.56
 Corporate governance reform efforts over the past twenty years, 
however, have sought to address many of these problems. There has 
developed a strong view as to corporate governance best practices 
designed to promote board independence and to enable the board to 
challenge decisions of the CEO.57 Some of these practices have been 
made mandatory for public companies under federal securities law 
and stock exchange listing rules.58 Such practices include: requiring a 
majority of directors to be independent;59 creating audit, compensa-
tion, and nominating committees composed of independent direc-
tors;60 having boards hold executive sessions outside the presence of 
officers;61 and separating the positions of CEO and  
                                                                                                                  
 56. See, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 202-03 
(3d ed. 2004). 
 57. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Board of Directors] (citing 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Committee 
on Corporate Laws, ABA, Corporate Director’s Guidebook 1994 Edition, 49 BUS. LAW. 1247, 
1249 (1994), and Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitive-
ness, March, 1990, 46 BUS. LAW. 241, 246 (1990)); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independ-
ent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market 
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468-69 (2007). But see Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 
A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 220 (2007) (“First, the CEO dislikes monitoring 
by the board because he values control. Second, the CEO likes advising by the board because 
advice increases firm value without interfering with his choices. Third, both monitoring and 
advising by the board are more effective when the board is better informed. Finally, in both 
roles, the board depends crucially on the CEO for firm-specific information.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 79 SEC Dock-
et 2876, 2878 (Apr. 9. 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240-10A-3(b) (2009) (codifying Exchange Act Rule 
10-A-3(b)); NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2010), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%
5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F. 
 59. See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good 
Corporate Governance Practices—Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (“Although 
independence of directors may not necessarily guarantee the best economic return to 
stockholders, I think the better view, generally, is that a worthwhile goal is to have a sig-
nificant majority of independent directors on the board. Independence offers to investors 
some assurance that the governance process has integrity.”).  
 60. See Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New 
Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829 (1999) (finding that when the CEO 
serves on the nominating committee or where there is no nominating committee the board 
consists of fewer independent directors and stock price reaction to independent director 
appointments is lower). 
 61. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Govern-
ance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2003).  
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board chairman.62 As many companies have put into place these re-
forms, boards of U.S. corporations have assumed a much more active 
role in monitoring the performance of the corporation.63 Many direc-
tors accept their role as monitors and have sought to increase the de-
gree to which they oversee officers.64
 A second objection is that the monitoring and managing roles of 
the board are inherently inconsistent.65 The argument is that boards 
which are involved in the management of the corporation lose the 
objectivity they need to be effective managerial monitors or, alterna-
tively, have a harmful, adversarial relationship with management.66
This argument implies that to the extent we want boards to be sup-
pliers of “board capital” to management, we cannot expect them to be 
effective monitors. But in reality, boards carry out both functions, 
and the degree to which a board acts as monitor or manager depends 
on the special characteristics of the corporation.67 Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                  
 62. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Theory and Practice: Chairman-CEO Split Gains Allies—
Corporate Leaders Push for Firms to Improve Oversight by Separating Roles, WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 2009, at B4 (reporting that by March 2008, shareholders submitted thirty-nine resolutions 
seeking to require the split of the board chair and the chief executive officer); see also MILLSTEIN 
CTR. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE, CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR 
INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE NORTH AMERICA (2009), 
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/2009%2003%2030%20Chairing%20The%20Board%20final.pdf 
(recommending that all North American public companies elect to have an independent 
chair of the board of directors). 
 63. See, e.g., William R. Boulton, The Evolving Board: A Look at the Board’s Changing 
Roles and Information Needs, 3 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 827, 828 (1978) (observing from forty-
five interviews with CEOs and directors of seven large U.S. companies that “[t]he changing 
of the board’s role is seen as a process of evolution in which the board moves beyond provid-
ing basic legitimacy for the corporation to more actively auditing the results of corporate 
performance and, finally, to playing an involved role of questioning the viability of the 
firm’s long-term direction and success.”); Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira M. Millstein, The Active 
Board of Directors and Its Effect on the Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation,
11 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8-11 (1999); see also Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 
238-39 (describing the “monitoring model of the board [as] almost universally accepted”). 
 64. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 15 (citing a survey of 2,000 directors 
in the United States conducted before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reporting that 
the directors “consistently favored more monitoring than was the practice on the boards on 
which they served”). 
 65. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin 
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 632-38 (1982); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 280-82 (1997). But see Praveen Kumar & K. Sivaramakrishnan, Who 
Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and 
Firm Value, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1371 (2008) (finding that board independence and board 
incentive pay are substitutes which permit independent boards to be less effective monitors 
than less independent boards). 
 66. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1753-59 (2001) (noting 
that constant conflict between directors and officers is harmful to the corporation). One 
result of an adversarial relationship is that boards end up second-guessing the CEO and 
inhibiting CEO initiative. See Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. LAW. 1427, 
1433 (1995).  
 67. See Fisch, supra note 65, at 282-89; see also Renée B. Adams, What do Boards do? 
Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data (Mar. 13, 2003) (un-
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skills that enable boards to play a role in management are also the 
skills that make boards better monitors.68 Boards would have a better 
understanding of the business and, therefore, would be in a better 
position to identify inefficiencies and undesirable risks. Boards also 
require a requisite amount of managerial experience to evaluate 
properly the performance of officers. Stronger legal rules, such as the 
one argued for by this Article, that push directors to be better in-
formed and remain cognizant of their ultimate responsibilities to the 
shareholders should help ensure that directors are not captured by 
the CEO and fail to be vigilant monitors. Thus, concerns that the 
managerial board model conflicts with a monitoring board model 
should be rejected.  
 A more robust duty to monitor will improve board effectiveness as 
monitor and manager. The proposed corporate governance reforms, 
discussed above, focus on the board’s independence from the CEO. 
Promoting board independence, however, assumes that if the CEO’s 
influence over the board is curbed, the board will naturally become a 
better monitor,69 but empirical evidence does not support this as-
sumption.70 While these reforms may make it easier for boards to be 
more vigorous monitors, they do not provide a convincing explanation 
for why boards actually would want to take on the headaches of chal-
lenging the CEO.71 One reform designed to better align the interests 
                                                                                                                  
published working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397401 (finding that 
boards of diversified firms spend more time monitoring while boards of growing firms 
spend more time on strategic planning). Donald Langevoort has argued that the ideal 
board structure may consist of a combination of monitoring and managerial directors ac-
companied by one of two directors who serve as mediators. See Donald C. Langevoort, The 
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 815 (2001) [hereinafter Langevoort, 
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards]. 
 68. See Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 54, at 389; see also Mason A. Carpenter & 
James D. Westphal, The Strategic Context of External Network Ties: Examining the Impact 
of Director Appointments on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making, 44 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 639 (2001); Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS.
LAW. 1375, 1411 (2006) [hereinafter Sale, Independent Directors] (referring to director re-
ports that greater independence and monitoring actually improves the relationship be-
tween the board and CEO and enables boards to request more information from executive 
officers about corporate strategy). 
 69. See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 48, at 97. But see Langevoort, The Human 
Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 807 (noting how overconfident outside direc-
tors, unchecked by inside directors, may result in biased decisionmaking). 
 70. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921-22 (1999); see also James D. 
Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence 
from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 512 (1998).  
 71. Victor Brudney notes that there is no reason why one should assume that inde-
pendent directors desire to be serious monitors. Brudney, supra note 65, at 609-16. Charles
Yablon, however, argues that the power of CEOs has actually decreased over the past 
twenty years. Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
89, 123-27 (2007). He notes that the average tenure of CEOs at U.S. corporations has de-
creased and there has been an increased rate of firing of CEOs. Id. at 123.   
2011] RETHINKING THE BOARD’S DUTY TO MONITOR 225
of boards with shareholders in improving shareholder value is to give 
directors stock options. In theory, a share of the corporation’s equity 
will motivate directors to take a greater interest in the activities of the 
corporation and “crack the whip” when officers fail to perform.72 But 
equity compensation is a blunt instrument to ensure greater board at-
tention.73 Alternatively, reformers hope that increasing the threat of 
removal by activist shareholders will spur directors to act more in the 
interests of shareholders. Here too, the threat of removal seems to be a 
suboptimal corporate governance strategy, as incumbent directors con-
tinue to enjoy strong advantages in winning reelection.74
 Incredibly, the role of fiduciary duties in motivating directors to be 
better monitors is absent from the debate.75 The misalignment of in-
terests between shareholders and boards, and the high transaction 
costs associated with the use of shareholder voting and incentive 
compensation packages to motivate directors produce a textbook case 
for the use of fiduciary duties, especially the duty to monitor.76 If, as 
argued in this Article, current fiduciary obligations on directors are 
inadequate to ensure effective monitoring, the legislature and courts 
should recognize a more robust duty to monitor.  
B.  A Broader Scope: Monitoring of Business Risk 
 The duty to monitor should demand boards keep themselves in-
formed and participate in the management of the corporation in situ-
ations where we have the greatest concerns about officers’ ability to 
protect shareholders’ interests. Factors to consider would be the like-
lihood that officers will make an error or otherwise be careless result-
ing in harm to the corporation and the magnitude of the potential 
harm to the corporation. One reason why we may question officers’ 
                                                                                                                  
 72. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured 
Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1995); David Yer-
mack, Renumeration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN.
2281 (2004). 
 73. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 121-36 (2004); Assaf Hamdani & 
Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1682-85 (2007). 
Recent psychological research suggests that bonuses and other high monetary rewards can 
actually adversely affect performance by forcing employees to focus too narrowly on their 
bonus objectives. See Dan Ariely, Uri Gneezy, George Loewenstein & Nina Mazar, Large 
Stakes and Big Mistakes, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 451 (2009). 
 74. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43, 44-46, 64-66 (2003) (describing the difficulties faced by shareholders attempting 
to replace incumbent directors). 
 75. Many dismiss the role of fiduciary duties because of the various limitations on 
directors’ personal liability for fiduciary breaches. Such objections will be addressed later 
in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55 and Part V. 
 76. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 
299, 299-302 (1993) (finding fiduciary duties are necessary in a world of incomplete con-
tracts); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual 
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 407 (1993). 
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ability to work without board oversight is that they lack the appro-
priate objectivity.77 Likewise, we expect greater board oversight for 
activities that may have a disproportionate impact on the health of 
the corporation.  
 The duty to monitor would be more effective if courts held boards 
responsible for overseeing business risk and the implementation of 
business decisions. Limiting the duty to monitor only to wrongful and 
illegal acts leaves out other acts, which may not be illegal but are 
still harmful to the corporation. Such acts are generally harmful be-
cause they represent assumption of risk that may be considered by a 
deliberative board as excessive.  
 The difficulty with extending the duty to monitor to require board 
oversight of business risk is how such a duty would be enforced. A 
court considering claims that the board failed to monitor business 
risk would be tempted to substitute its business judgment for that of 
the board’s. Chancellor Chandler raised this objection in the  
Citigroup decision.78
 It is difficult, however, to see how a court considering a board’s 
failure to consider business risk would be rejecting the business 
judgment of a board in favor of its own. First, a duty to monitor claim 
would not exist unless the board failed to exercise any business 
judgment. The purpose of the duty is to ensure that boards are vigi-
lant and informed enough to be in a position where they can exercise 
their business judgment. Furthermore, enforcement of the duty to 
monitor only requires a court to consider a class of outcomes that are 
harmful enough to the corporation to justify liability for oversight 
failure. Appropriate outcomes should include those that result in cor-
porate insolvency or otherwise threaten the corporation’s ability to 
continue to operate as a going concern.  
 The distinction between liability for directorial decisions and lia-
bility for failure to monitor is one of process and substance. When the 
board makes a decision, directors enjoy the full protection of the 
business judgment rule, provided that they make a good faith effort to 
be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment.79 The process by 
which a board makes its decision is of paramount concern, and this is 
                                                                                                                  
 77. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management 19 
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 09-08, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364500 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Manage-
ment] (noting that even in situation where there is no self-dealing, executive officer self-
interest may still contribute to risk management failures). 
 78. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(“To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to succeed on a theory that a direc-
tor is liable for a failure to monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well 
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a hindsight evaluation of the 
reasonableness or prudence of directors’ business decisions.”). 
 79. Id. at 124. 
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the only focus of a court’s inquiry.80 The substantive outcome of the 
decision is ignored entirely. Success or failure is the responsibility of 
the board, and its decision will not be second-guessed by the court.81
Presumably a board that has made a bad decision will find itself sub-
ject to the ire of the shareholders at the next annual meeting.  
 When the board fails to act, on the other hand, a court becomes 
involved because of the substantive outcome of this failure to act. 
Committing illegal acts that result in criminal or civil penalties, for 
example, is a substantively bad outcome for the company. The exist-
ence of this bad outcome results in a lawsuit and becomes the basis 
for deciding a duty to monitor claim (i.e., that the board should have 
prevented the outcome). At that point, the court must consider 
whether the board was in a position to prevent or stop the illegal act. 
This is ultimately an inquiry into the process followed by the board in 
monitoring the activities of the corporation. This process is laid out in 
the Caremark standard.82
 This requirement that courts consider the substantive outcome of 
a board’s inaction naturally limits the scope and application of the 
duty to monitor. Courts will be uncomfortable in assessing whether a 
company is doing well or poorly as a business. A duty to monitor 
claim, however, can only be considered if a court concludes that the 
board’s failure to act produced a bad outcome for the company. In or-
der to get around their natural aversion to making such judgments, 
judges need to seek out defined categories of outcomes where they 
feel comfortable applying a duty to monitor analysis. Because judges 
are experts in law, the obvious category is violations of law. There-
fore, it is not surprising that Delaware courts have limited duty to 
monitor claims to illegal acts. But there is no reason why courts must 
constrain themselves to this narrow set of outcomes, especially since 
judges retain the ability to excuse boards from liability by concluding 
that they did have in place reasonable monitoring systems or did 
make good faith efforts to prevent harm to the corporation. Judges 
can and should be willing to take on cases involving a more expansive 
list of bad outcomes that will lead them to apply a duty to monitor 
analysis. This list would include, for example, performance failures 
by the company that threaten the solvency of the company but do not 
involve illegal acts.  
                                                                                                                  
 80. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of 
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 675-76
(2002); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that the merits of a 
business decision are considered separately from the process used to reach that decision). 
 81. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due 
care only.”). 
 82. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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 Such a stance would be consistent with the reasoning of Graham 
and Caremark. In supporting a sharper interpretation of Graham,
Chancellor Allen argued that for boards to meet their obligation to be 
reasonably informed concerning the corporation they need to: 
assur[e] themselves that information and reporting systems exist 
in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to sen-
ior management and to the board itself timely, accurate infor-
mation sufficient to allow management and the board . . . to reach 
informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance 
with law and its business performance.83
It is logical that systematic monitoring is a task that must be under-
taken not only to ensure legal compliance but also successful (or at 
least nondisastrous) business results. As Chancellor Allen himself 
noted, “[d]irectors are not specialists like lawyers . . . [but rather] 
general advisors of the business . . . .”84 If directors are equipped to 
perform any type of monitoring, it must be of the business perfor-
mance of the corporation. Courts should enforce this duty by more 
aggressively applying the duty to monitor.  
 In order for boards to be effective monitors of business risk, they 
must be independent, have adequate resources, and possess compre-
hensive information. Recent corporate governance reforms have 
sought to address the problem of board independence. Boards also 
have sought to secure additional resources to carry out their duties. 
For instance, boards can, and frequently do, hire their own financial 
advisors, legal counsel, and accounting firms to assist them.85 Corpo-
rations can also impose more exacting requirements on new board 
members, just as Citigroup did when it began looking for directors 
with “expertise in finance and investments.”86 Collection of infor-
mation, however, is subject to a board’s ability to compel the CEO to 
share relevant and timely information. While a more robust duty to 
monitor may motivate boards to supervise officers more aggressively, 
the key prerequisite must be boards’ ability to obtain comprehensive, 
accurate, and timely information about corporate operations and  
related risks.87
                                                                                                                  
 83. Id. at 970 (emphasis added); see Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Management,
supra note 77, at 18 (“Chancellor Allen thus obviously intended the Caremark duty to ex-
tend beyond mere law compliance to include such issues as business risk management.”). 
 84. Caremark, 698 A.2d. at 968. 
 85. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 
18788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 & 274) (requiring public 
companies to grant their audit committees the authority to engage independent counsel 
and other advisors, as such committees deem necessary to carry out their duties).  
86. Citigroup Director Search, CITIGROUP, INC., http://www.citigroup.com/citi/ 
corporategovernance/directorsearch.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
 87. See Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 244-46; see also Fama & Jen-
sen, supra note 49, at 314. 
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 In the previous section, this Article noted the gap in perception of 
boards’ ability to serve as monitors and the necessity of boards to 
play a more active monitoring role. There is also a gap in perception 
of boards having enough information to perform their monitoring role 
and the actual extent to which corporations have systems in place 
that provide boards with the information they need to be effective 
monitors.88 Internal control and information reporting systems are 
expensive in both time and money.89 Monitoring systems that feel 
invasive to officers also may breed distrust, distract, and inhibit risk 
taking.90 Despite these costs, U.S. public corporations have invested 
heavily in recent years in internal control and information reporting 
systems, expanding significantly the scope of these systems.    
 The history of internal control and information reporting systems, 
especially the internal control requirements for financial reporting 
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has been described ex-
tensively elsewhere.91 What is of greater interest is how internal con-
trol and information reporting systems have advanced since Sar-
banes-Oxley. The evolving recommendations of the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)92
provide insight into the scope of internal control and information re-
porting systems adopted by U.S. public corporations. COSO has is-
sued several reports that build upon its original 1992 report Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework.93 The 1992 report laid out an inter-
                                                                                                                  
 88. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 
724 (2007) (“Monitoring systems are . . . within the directors’ purview. They must approve 
and oversee them. . . . Thus, the systems are key to the role of directors and, once estab-
lished, allow directors to focus on other strategic decisions.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting 
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 959-60 
(2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley].
 90. See id.
 91. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 240-44; Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Ac-
countability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2002); Lange-
voort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 89, at 954-57. 
 92. COSO is sponsored by the five leading U.S. accounting associations: American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), American Accounting Association 
(AAA), Financial Executives International (FEI), Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and 
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREAD-
WAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY FRAMEWORK iii (2004) [hereinafter 1 COSO 2004 REPORT]. 
 93. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, AIPCA, INTERNAL CON-
TROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992) [hereinafter COSO 1992 REPORT]; see also Eisen-
berg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 244 (describing the 1992 COSO report as the 
definite treatment of internal controls of its time); Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sar-
banes-Oxley, supra note 89, at 955 (noting that the SEC recognized the 1992 COSO report 
as the only suitable framework for internal controls, making the report the de facto stand-
ard); Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification 
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, 36641 (June 18, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274) (recognizing the  
COSO framework). 
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nal control framework to achieve “[e]ffectiveness and efficiency of op-
erations[,] [r]eliability of financial reporting[,] [and] [c]ompliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.”94 The focus on legal compli-
ance and accuracy of financial reporting is consistent with the scope 
of Delaware’s duty to monitor which is limited to the prevention of 
illegal acts. In 2004, COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework where COSO recommended internal control 
and information reporting systems to identify, assess, and manage 
“enterprise risk.”95 Enterprise risk management consists of reducing 
operational surprises and losses, seizing opportunities to improve 
corporate value, and improving deployment of capital—capabilities to 
“help management achieve the entity’s performance and profitability 
targets and prevent loss of resources.”96 What is striking about the 
COSO guidance on enterprise risk is that it recasts internal controls 
as being a tool to manage business risk, a task that goes far beyond 
what is required of the information reporting systems mandated by 
Delaware courts.97 Furthermore, COSO reaffirms boards’ role in 
overseeing enterprise risk management systems and to rely not only 
on reports from officers but also to draw upon internal and external 
auditors and other resources.98
 U.S. companies have embraced enterprise risk management. In a 
2005-2006 survey of corporate directors, The Conference Board and 
McKinsey & Co. found that an increasing number of directors consid-
ered overseeing business risk as their responsibility and that con-
templation of business risk is part of “every conversation they have 
about strategy.”99 In a 2002 survey, McKinsey found that almost half 
of the directors surveyed (200 directors representing over 500 boards) 
described their procedures to consider enterprise risk as “non-
                                                                                                                  
 94. See COSO 1992 REPORT, supra note 93, at 9. 
 95. 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92; COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE 
TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: APPLICA-
TION TECHNIQUES (2004) [hereinafter 2 COSO 2004 REPORT].
 96. See 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 3. 
 97. See 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 109-12, app. C (explaining how “en-
terprise risk management is broader than internal control”); MATTEO TONELLO, EMERGING
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 17 (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963221 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s impact on internal control is 
narrowly focused on managing the risk of fraud and ensuring accurate financial reporting. 
[Enterprise risk management], on the other hand, encompasses a wider array of the busi-
ness risks the corporation is exposed to, including strategic and operational risks.”). It is 
helpful to note that the concept of enterprise risk management includes using risk meas-
urement techniques such as Value-at-Risk (VaR). See GREGORY MONAHAN, ENTERPRISE 
RISK MANAGEMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 22-45 (2008).
VaR is commonly used to measure potential losses on trading activities. See Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 149-50 (2009).  
 98. 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 83-84. 
 99. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, ET AL., THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN EN-
TERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 5-6, 15-22 (2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=941179.
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existent or ineffective.”100 The survey also found “that non-financial 
risks received only ‘anecdotal treatment’ ” in board deliberations.101
By 2005-2006, boards of large U.S. public companies assumed much 
greater command of enterprise risk management with nearly 90% of 
surveyed directors (127 directors) stating they believed that they ap-
proached a full or very good understanding of their corporations’ 
risks.102 More significantly, the survey found evidence that directors 
distinguished between business risk and accuracy of financial infor-
mation, and that they placed a higher priority on managing business 
risk.103 The survey results suggest that by 2005-2006 most directors 
of large U.S. corporations understood the need for internal control 
and information reporting systems that go beyond the requirements 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
 Surveyed directors also described the division of responsibilities in 
the largest corporations concerning enterprise risk management. 
While directors generally believe that enterprise risk management is 
the responsibility of the CEO, all surveyed directors agreed that their 
role consisted of both overseeing the process of risk management and 
having oversight for corporate strategy.104 This result highlights how 
in practice directors have embraced their role as both monitor  
and manager.  
 The COSO recommendations and the survey results of The Confer-
ence Board and McKinsey indicate that board oversight exceeds the 
minimum requirements set by the Delaware courts. Boards recognize 
that they are expected and often prepared to monitor a broader range 
of corporate activities, and they consider it their responsibility to man-
age all risks that may have a material impact on corporate perfor-
mance. Delaware courts should take heed of these recent trends to 
acknowledge expectations shared by shareholders and directors alike 
that boards have a duty to monitor all business risks.105
C.   Inferring Scienter: A Board’s Failure to Act in Good Faith as a 
Rebuttable Presumption 
 Since Stone when the Delaware Supreme Court declared that a 
board’s duty to monitor was part of its duty to act in good faith, Del-
aware courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts that demonstrate 
                                                                                                                  
 100. Id. at 15. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 16. 
 103. See id. at 17. (53.3 percent of the surveyed directors believed strategic risk posed 
the greatest threat to their firms, “while only 15.7 percent indicate[d] ‘financial risk’ as 
their key concern.”). 
 104. Id. at 23. 
 105. Former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court E. Norman Veasey has ar-
gued that courts consider corporate governance trends and best practices in the develop-
ment of corporate law. Veasey, supra note 59, at 2189-90. 
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scienter.106 Delaware courts have described the scienter requirement 
to mean that plaintiffs need to show that directors knew that they 
were failing to fulfill their monitoring duties.107 It is not enough to 
show that directors had the opportunity to spot wrongdoing or illegal 
conduct, nor is it enough to show that the directors were or should 
have been in a position to see such conduct.108 Instead, plaintiffs must 
present facts to suggest that the directors acted with a “culpable 
state of mind.”109 It is this culpable state of mind that lies at the 
heart of the meaning of bad faith—a conscious disregard for one’s re-
sponsibilities. This requirement, however, is difficult for plaintiffs to 
meet. Rarely do plaintiffs have access to documents or other sources 
of evidence that reveal with particularity the defendants’ state of 
mind, especially at the pleading stage.110 Instead plaintiffs must con-
vince the court to infer scienter from the board’s actions.  
 Scienter poses a particular problem in the context of the duty to 
monitor. Plaintiffs must attempt to show that a board failed to act in 
good faith by virtue of its lack of action. In such a case, what would 
serve as evidence of a culpable state of mind? Vice Chancellor Strine 
has suggested that culpability can be inferred by showing persistent 
indolence.111 The logic is that a board may fail to monitor so persis-
tently that the only reasonable explanation for its behavior is that it 
intended to evade its monitoring duty. However, what does it mean 
                                                                                                                  
 106. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007).  
 107. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff must also plead 
particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter, i.e., that they had 
‘actual or constructive knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”); Desimone, 924 
A.2d at 940 (“Thus, in order to state a viable Caremark claim . . . a plaintiff must plead the 
existence of facts suggesting that the board knew that internal controls were inadequate, that 
the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or materially harmful behavior, and that the 
board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that it knew existed.”); Stone v. Rit-
ter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the direc-
tors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”).  
 108. See, e.g., Desimone, 924 A.2d at 940. 
 109. Id. at 931. 
 110. Because there will not be any discovery at the time of pleading, plaintiffs will have 
limited access to materials that enable them to plead with particularity. Delaware courts 
have acknowledged this difficulty but have suggested a books and records request as a 
suitable mechanism for procuring information. Wood, 953 A.2d at 144 n.25 (“[F]ailure to 
make a books and records demand rendered plaintiff ‘unable to plead any facts about what 
the . . . board did, when they did it, what they discussed, what conclusions they reached, 
and why the board did or did not do anything’ . . . .” (citing Desimone, 924 A.2d at 951)); 
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 n.52 (Del. 2004) (“[P]laintiff should pursue a books 
and records inspection in order to secure the facts necessary to support an allegation of 
demand futility if the factual allegations would otherwise fall short.”). 
 111. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935 (“Caremark itself encouraged directors to act with rea-
sonable diligence, but plainly held that director liability for failure to monitor required a 
finding that the directors acted with the state of mind traditionally used to define the 
mindset of a disloyal director—bad faith—because their indolence was so persistent that it 
could not be ascribed to anything other than a knowing decision not to even try to make 
sure the corporation’s officers had developed and were implementing a prudent approach to 
ensuring law compliance.”). 
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to fail to monitor persistently? On one hand, there is the failure to 
put into place an internal control and information reporting system. 
The absence of a monitoring system would seem to be a clear case of 
failing to monitor. But what if the board has put in place some sys-
tem? Caremark stated that the board had to have in place a “reason-
ably designed” system.112 Thus, plaintiffs would need to show that the 
directors knew that their system was not reasonably designed—a 
very difficult task to prove and one that cannot be easily inferred 
from the board’s behavior.  
 The more fruitful line of attack for plaintiffs would be to show that 
even with a monitoring system in place, the board ignored or failed to 
react to information reported by the system. In other words, the mon-
itoring system brought to the board’s attention certain red flags, and 
the board failed to act in the face of such red flags. This line of argu-
ment poses two burdens on plaintiffs. First, they must tell the court 
which red flags the board should have seen. Plaintiffs have attempt-
ed to point to well-publicized news commentary or market trends as 
evidence of red flags, but courts have rejected these red flags as being 
too broad.113 Second, they must show that the red flags actually came 
to the directors’ attention and that they ignored them. This is also 
difficult to demonstrate. In recent cases, courts have rejected plain-
tiffs’ attempts to infer that directors saw the red flags because they 
either served on certain key board committees or had executed cer-
tain transaction documents.114
 It is difficult to avoid the fact that the duty to monitor as articu-
lated in Caremark does not actually require the presence of scienter 
(as defined by recent Delaware court cases) but rather supports 
broader applicability. In Caremark, Chancellor Allen viewed a 
board’s liability as stemming from an “unconsidered failure of the 
board to act.”115 After all, the purpose of the duty is to ensure that the 
board does not allow itself to be caught off-guard. Chancellor Allen 
would have considered the Caremark directors to have breached their 
duty of care if the plaintiffs could show that the directors knew of the 
wrongdoing or “should have known that violations of law were occur-
ring.”116 This language implies some objective standard of diligence. 
The purpose of the standard was to avoid the “head in the sand” be-
havior that Graham rewarded. Caremark, however, accepted the no-
tion that a board should be held responsible only for knowing that 
                                                                                                                  
 112. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
 113. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 128  
(Del. Ch. 2009).  
 114. See Wood, 953 A.2d at 142-43 (noting that it is not enough that the board ap-
proved an improper transaction or served on particular board committee as neither pro-
vides proof of the directors’ state of mind). 
 115. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis omitted). 
 116. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
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which would be detected by a monitoring system slightly more com-
petent than an “utter failure”—a low threshold indeed.117
 Given that the first part of the Caremark standard is about ensur-
ing that boards have in place some type of minimally adequate moni-
toring system, scienter is not a factor that should be taken into con-
sideration. If anything, the scienter requirement undermines the 
first part of the Caremark test because it will only serve to excuse 
those directors who fail to have in place a reasonable information re-
porting system but just did not realize that fact. The scienter element 
brings back the “head in the sand” effect of Graham, taking what was 
already an extremely easy test for directors and turning it into a 
meaningless one. An incurious board would always avoid liability. In 
addition, it turns on its head Chancellor Allen’s purpose for recogniz-
ing some oversight liability, which was “to act as a stimulus to good 
faith performance of duty by such directors.”118 In this respect, good 
faith means having directors pursue their duties diligently, not that 
they only need to make minimal efforts and “go through the motions” 
of collecting information.  
 Actual knowledge also is inconsistent with the second part of the 
Caremark standard. After a red flag is identified, a board’s liability 
does not stem merely from the failure to act on the red flag, but ra-
ther from the failure to act due to a conscious decision or a failure to 
recognize or react to the obvious danger. A conscious decision by the 
board to ignore the red flag, however, is a business decision and like 
all business decisions should be reviewed by the court with deference 
under the business judgment rule. It is only when the failure to act 
stems from board inattention or omission that a claim can be made 
that the board violated its duty to monitor.  
 Thus, the scienter requirement does not fit comfortably with a du-
ty that results from a lack of deliberation by the board. The scienter 
requirement forces plaintiffs to undermine their own claims because 
they will have to produce particularized facts that the board recog-
nized a red flag, which undoubtedly will reveal that the board exer-
cised its business judgment in deciding how to react to the red flag. It 
is important to note that a valid business decision could be the deci-
sion to ignore a red flag. As a result, the only types of cases where 
there could be a successful duty to monitor claim (provided that a 
monitoring system was present) is a situation where the business 
judgment rule or section 102(b)(7) exculpation would not have pro-
vided protection to begin with, which is the conduct of wrongful or 
                                                                                                                  
 117. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of 
Banks, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 102-03 (2003) (arguing that the Caremark standard is too 
low for the banking industry because bank directors have a continuing obligation to devel-
op and maintain detailed and elaborate systems for monitoring and oversight). 
 118. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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illegal acts. Such a framework prevents the duty to monitor from be-
ing applied in other contexts. 
 Is there another way to define scienter such that plaintiffs do not 
have to show actual knowledge of a problem by the board? The fed-
eral district court decision in Countrywide offers an alternative: Del-
aware courts could adopt the definition of scienter as applied by fed-
eral courts in deciding section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 securities fraud 
cases.119 The vast majority of federal circuits have interpreted scien-
ter to include recklessness.120 The accepted understanding of reck-
lessness is “highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely sim-
ple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care”121 or, in the opinion of one circuit, 
“carelessness approaching indifference.”122 Such a standard requires 
an objective determination by the court of the defendant’s state of 
mind.123 For example, the court might make such a determination by 
asking if the defendant complied with applicable rules and corporate 
governance standards.124 Accepting recklessness as part of scienter 
invites courts to second guess the action (or inaction) of the defend-
ant to decide if the defendant really did act in good faith. Whereas 
Delaware courts’ understanding of scienter requires plaintiffs to 
plead facts that show the defendant’s state of mind, recklessness sets 
aside the question of what was the defendant’s actual state of mind 
in favor of an inference of scienter based upon the defendant’s ac-
tions.125 The Ninth Circuit has adopted an even more refined formu-
lation of the standard of scienter; it requires plaintiffs to plead evi-
                                                                                                                  
 119. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (deciding that there must be 
an allegation of scienter for a cause of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act and rule 10b-5). 
 120. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 670-73 (5th ed. 2006); 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIG-
MAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3688-90 (3d ed. rev. 2004). 
 121. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 122. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 123. Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Scienter, 
Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179, 185 (1986). 
 124. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, supra note 24, at 490 (discussing the implications of 
the federal recklessness standards on the Delaware duty of good faith). 
 125. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 515 
(2009) (“As with any mental state, scienter cannot be established by direct evidence, but 
only circumstantially.”); see also Milich, supra note 123, at 187-91. Milich describes this 
understanding of scienter as the “disjunctive approach” where recklessness is determined 
independently of intent. Id. at 187. As noted by Milich, Oliver Wendell Holmes advocated 
the disjunctive approach: “[I]t means that the law, applying a general objective standard, 
determines that, if a man makes his statement on . . . [grossly insufficient] data, he is lia-
ble, whatever was the state of his mind, and although he individually may have been per-
fectly free of wickedness in making it.” Id. at 188 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 108 (1963 ed.) (emphasis omitted)). Milich notes that most federal courts 
followed the disjunctive approach in their application of recklessness. Id. at 191-92. 
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dence of “deliberate recklessness.”126 Deliberate recklessness implies 
that courts should still seek evidence of the defendant’s state of 
mind.127 Delaware courts may find deliberate recklessness as a possi-
ble middle ground for incorporating recklessness into its understand-
ing of scienter. 
 To illustrate how a deliberate recklessness standard broadens the 
scope of the duty to monitor, consider In re Countrywide Financial 
Corp. Derivative Litigation.128 Countrywide was a decision of the U.S. 
District Court of the Central District of California concerning direc-
tor violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and the Delaware duty to monitor.129 The plaintiffs sought to hold 
certain directors responsible for approving an increase in the origina-
tion of non-conforming loans, extending in contravention of company 
underwriting standards, and failing to maintain appropriate reserves 
and allowances to offset the company’s riskier loan portfolio.130 Like 
the Citigroup board, the Countrywide board approved a strategy and 
set of business practices that exposed the firm to greater risk.  
 Countrywide presents an interesting case because it is a duty to 
monitor case decided by a federal court. Furthermore, the federal 
court was deciding the monitoring claims alongside the section 10(b) 
claims. The court applied the Ninth Circuit standard of “deliberate 
recklessness.”131 In applying this standard, the district court made 
more aggressive inferences of the board’s scienter beyond what would 
have been made by any Delaware court. Evidence of deliberate reck-
                                                                                                                  
 126. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974, 976-77 (citing Hol-
linger, 914 F.2d at 1569) (9th Cir. 1999). Despite being the only circuit to require “deliber-
ate recklessness” to prove scienter, the Ninth Circuit, like the rest of the federal circuits, 
has agreed that Congress did not change the scienter standard in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) when it 
imposed the requirement that every complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to 
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 
78u-4(b)(2) (2006). See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000). As 
to whether the same provision of the PSLRA changed the pleading requirements for scien-
ter, the U.S. Supreme Court settled this question in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), when it concluded that Congress intended to strengthen existing 
pleading requirements. Id. at 310 (“A complaint will survive only if a reasonable person 
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any plausible 
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”). The Tellabs decision brought 
the federal pleading standard closer to the Delaware pleading standard.  
 127. In a recent case, SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., however, the Ninth Circuit 
appeared to open the door to applying a scienter standard much closer to the less burden-
some recklessness standard accepted in other federal circuits. 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
2010). While it affirmed the deliberate recklessness standard, it permitted plaintiffs to 
pass summary judgment by an objective evaluation of the defendant’s mental state as op-
posed to a subjective evaluation of the defendant’s actual state of mind. See id. at 1093-94. 
 128. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 129. See id. at 1057-71, 1077-83. 
 130. Id. at 1050-52. 
 131. Id. at 1057. 
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lessness included statements of fourteen low-level employees (out of 
50,000 employees) describing the deterioration of Countrywide’s un-
derwriting standards.132 Even though the plaintiffs could not show 
that the directors had any contact with these employees or that con-
cerns raised by the employees ever reached the directors, the court 
concluded that the defendants must have known about what was 
happening because the underwriting practices were so pervasive 
across the corporation.133 Other evidence of deliberate recklessness 
was the fact that the defendants served on key board committees re-
sponsible for monitoring Countrywide’s financial statements.134 The 
plaintiffs convinced the court that the financial impact of the prob-
lematic loans constituted red flags that must have been seen by any 
director who was on a board committee tasked with preparing or re-
viewing the corporation’s financial statements.135 Again, the court did 
not require plaintiffs to show that the defendants actually had 
knowledge of these red flags or proof that such red flags were brought 
to the attention of the defendants. The Countrywide decision shows 
that recognition of recklessness shifts the understanding of scienter 
away from what the defendants actually did know toward what they 
should have known or were in a position to know.  
 With its reliance on objective criteria to judge a board’s behavior, 
the deliberate recklessness standard looks suspiciously like gross 
negligence, and this poses a problem under Delaware law. Gross neg-
ligence has long been considered under Delaware law as a breach of 
the duty of care exculpated by section 102(b)(7). But, as noted by 
Chancellor Chandler, Delaware’s gross negligence standard has 
shown some elasticity over the past few years.136 Before the Delaware 
Supreme Court explained the meaning of the duty of good faith in 
Brehm and Stone, Delaware courts defined gross negligence as “reck-
                                                                                                                  
 132. See id. at 1058. 
 133. See id. at 1058-59. 
 134. See id. at 1060. 
 135. See id. at 1062. Rather than demanding that the plaintiffs present facts demon-
strating actual knowledge by the directors of the wrongful acts conducted by the officers 
and employees of the company, the court instead inferred directors’ knowledge from their 
positions on at least one of the key board committees “charged with oversight of Country-
wide’s risk exposures, investment portfolio, and loan loss reserves. As such, they were in a 
position to recognize the significance of these red flags, and, accordingly, investigate the 
extent to which underwriting standards had been abandoned.” Id. at 1062 (footnote omit-
ted). The court specifically identified the relevant board committees to be the Audit and 
Ethics Committee, the Credit Committee, the Finance Committee, the Compensation 
Committee, and the Operations and Public Policy Committee. Id. at 1062 n.13. 
 136. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008). Part of the challenge 
for Delaware courts is trying to separate a scienter-based understanding of good faith from 
the duty of care analysis inherent in defining gross negligence. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, 
Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 
DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2005) (“My only point here is a descriptive one—that is, to point out that 
moving good faith to a substantive standard of intent does not avoid repetition of duty-of-
care analytics and, ultimately, confrontation with the business judgment rule.”). 
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less indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of 
stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason.”137
Since then, good faith has become separated from the original defini-
tion of gross negligence to mean “intentional dereliction of duty or 
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities,” and gross negligence in 
turn is now defined as “reckless indifference or actions without the 
bound of reason.”138 Of course, these definitions offer little guidance 
in the abstract. Only through consideration of actual cases will the 
distinction between gross negligence and good faith be fully under-
stood.139 The challenge will be to incorporate the standard of deliber-
ate recklessness into scienter in such a way that directors will not be 
found liable for only grossly negligent behavior.  
 One solution is to make a plaintiff’s claim of bad faith for a failure 
to monitor a rebuttable presumption. Plaintiffs should be allowed to 
demonstrate scienter by pleading facts that show a board’s deliberate 
recklessness. The burden then should be on the board to rebut the 
plaintiff’s case by providing evidence that it did carry out its monitor-
ing responsibilities in good faith. This can mean demonstrating to the 
court the manner in which the board ensured that a reasonable mon-
itoring system was put into place, the extent to which the board con-
sidered the findings of such monitoring system, and the exercise of its 
business judgment in considering red flags identified by the system.  
 We expect boards to act in good faith, and we must consider the 
difficulty of determining if a board has acted in good faith when we 
are trying to discern the board’s state of mind from the absence of its 
action. Our hope is that boards make good faith efforts to oversee 
corporate activities and prevent the occurrence of harmful events. 
The current standard, however, presumes that boards are monitoring 
in good faith—a questionable presumption given long-standing con-
cerns about board independence and qualifications. Turning good 
faith into a rebuttable presumption will encourage boards to take af-
firmative steps to exert monitoring efforts. More importantly, a re-
buttable presumption allows a court still to consider a director’s state 
of mind without imposing a near impossible burden on the plaintiff. 
It becomes the job of the defendant to explain how his recklessness 
does not constitute culpable conduct.    
                                                                                                                  
 137. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 192 (Del. Ch. 2005) (cit-
ing Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., CIV. A. No. 7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 5, 1990)). 
 138. See, e.g, id.
 139. See Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, supra note 24, at 491.  
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D. Monitoring After a Business Decision 
 In addition to addressing the question of what the duty to monitor 
should apply to (i.e., legal and business risks), courts also should re-
think when the duty to monitor should apply. Chancellor Allen was 
very firm in Caremark to distinguish between “liability for directorial 
decisions” and “liability for failure to monitor.”140 But Chancellor Al-
len did not address a third situation where the board has made a de-
cision—a decision that exposes the company to extensive business 
risk—and the board does not follow up on the decision and monitor 
its effects. What makes this situation different from the directorial 
decision situation contemplated by Chancellor Allen is that some de-
cisions do not have immediate effect on the corporation and that the-
se decisions are based upon assumptions made in the face of great 
uncertainty. In other words, decisions are subject to dynamic condi-
tions. What may be considered initially an appropriate decision for the 
corporation may become a reckless and harmful decision as facts become 
known and conditions change. Arguably, these so-called “decisions sub-
ject to change” are the types of decisions more commonly made by 
boards than the types of decisions where there is immediate effect be-
cause boards tend to be involved more often in the setting of long-term 
corporate strategy rather than in the making of day-to-day decisions.  
 The Citigroup case is such an example. The Citigroup board made 
a business decision to expose the firm to greater trading risks in or-
der to achieve higher profits.141 After the decision was made, howev-
er, the board relied on management to implement the strategy and 
did not inform itself of the manner in which the strategy was being 
implemented.142 Two years later, the board became aware for the first 
time that the activities of the firm stemming from its original deci-
sion had produced losses that threatened the solvency of the firm.143
Extending business judgment rule protection to the board for its ear-
ly 2005 decision would be inappropriate given the length of time that 
had passed since the initial decision and the fact that conditions had 
changed so dramatically in that period. The Citigroup situation also 
raises the question of implementation. A trading strategy approved 
by the board was implemented in a manner where excessive risk was 
                                                                                                                  
 140. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
Chancellor Allen did not believe that the duty of monitor plays into board decisions because 
most corporate decisions do not involve the board. The board is only involved in the most 
significant corporate acts. See id. 
 141. See Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1; see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 
112-14 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 142. Dash & Creswell, supra note 141, at A1. 
 143. Id.
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taken on by the firm without the board’s knowledge.144 Failure of the 
board to ensure that there is proper implementation of corporate 
strategy is a form of board inaction and, therefore, a breach of the 
duty to monitor. 
 One can anticipate the counter-argument that the Citigroup situa-
tion is a unique case because the financial crisis was an improbable 
event. The financial crisis caught many financial institutions off-
guard and is considered by many as a tail event, albeit a fat tail 
event.145 To hold boards liable for failing to anticipate improbable 
events would result in overinvestment in monitoring. But the fact of 
the matter is that there are many occasions where boards make deci-
sions in the face of uncertainty and where follow-up monitoring by 
the board after the initial decision is desirable.146 To illustrate, con-
sider a different example, one that does not relate to the circum-
stances of the financial crisis. A company finds itself struggling 
against fierce domestic and foreign competition. In order to save the 
company, the board authorizes management to develop a new prod-
uct that, if successful, would revolutionize the market and restore the 
company’s position as a market leader. This project would require the 
devotion of a substantial amount of the company’s resources, and its 
failure would likely leave the company too financially weakened to 
ever again be a serious competitor, forcing the dissolution or sale of 
the company. Such a scenario broadly describes any “bet the com-
pany” decision by a board, whether it was Boeing’s decision in the 
1960s to build the 747 jumbo jet147 or General Motors’ plan to build 
the battery-powered Chevrolet Volt.148 These decisions go to the heart 
of the board’s role as monitor and manager. Because of the signifi-
                                                                                                                  
 144. The board relied entirely on company employees. One director said, “There is no 
way you would know what was going on with a risk book unless you’re directly involved 
with the trading arena. . . . We had highly experienced, highly qualified people running the 
operation.” Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Where Was the Wise Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2008, at 1. 
 145. See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007) (popularizing the notion that the interconnectedness of global financial 
institutions made them more susceptible to market events that lay outside  
regular expectations). 
 146. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 53, at 32 (“If the review process leads the board to 
approve corporate actions, the board must stand behind its assent. This support entails 
sharing with the CEO the risks of the decisions it approves, and the board should not ap-
prove decisions until it is fully willing to accept those risks.”). 
 147. EUGENE RODGERS, FLYING HIGH: THE STORY OF BOEING AND THE RISE OF THE JET-
LINER INDUSTRY 288 (1996) (“Although the 747 in its mature years helped Boeing to the 
pinnacle of financial success, the trauma of its birth nearly destroyed the company.”). 
 148. Jonathan Rauch, Electro-Shock Therapy: with the Chevy Volt, General Motors—
Battered, Struggling for Profitability, Fed Up with Being Eclipsed by Toyota and the Pri-
us—Is Out to Reinvent the Automobile, and Itself, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug. 
2008, at 84 (“Can GM pull this off? Whenever I asked this question inside the company, I 
got one or another version of the same answer: ‘Failure is not an option.’ . . . [E]veryone 
agreed that failure on the Volt, real or perceived, would be a severe setback.”). 
2011] RETHINKING THE BOARD’S DUTY TO MONITOR 241
cance of the project to the corporation’s ability to survive and the risk 
of the project, the board’s role should not end, nor should the board’s 
liability be extinguished, at the time the decision is made. Rather, we 
would expect that an informed board would revisit its initial decision 
and decide whether such project or strategy should be continued, 
modified, or terminated.149
 Again, the primary burden placed by the duty to monitor on the 
board is to be informed and to follow a process to consider such infor-
mation and evaluate relevant risks. A board’s judgment to defer to the 
CEO or to accept great business risk is a board’s prerogative and 
should not be questioned by a court. For example, as dreadful as the 
outcome may have been for the shareholders of Citigroup, the 
Citigroup board would have clearly met its duty to monitor—even the 
more robust duty suggested by this Article—if the board had shown 
itself to be informed of the risks being taken by the firm. With this in 
mind, courts should recognize that this monitoring duty applies to a 
broader range of cases than that contemplated by the current doctrine.  
IV.   IN DEFENSE OF A MORE ROBUST DUTY TO MONITOR
 A more robust duty to monitor that would include holding boards 
liable for monitoring business risks and require follow-up monitoring 
by boards would raise several concerns. The first concern is that such 
a standard would invite, if not require, judges to substitute their 
business judgment for that of the board. Such a role for judges would 
go against the basic principles of the business judgment rule. Judges 
would be evaluating the performance of directors with the benefit of 
perfect hindsight.150 It would be too tempting for judges to determine 
that the board missed obvious red flags and therefore breached its 
duty to monitor. As stated earlier, however, the duty to monitor does 
not ask nor want a court to second guess the judgment of the board. 
The duty to monitor only applies when there is evidence that the 
board, as a result of its complacency, failed to keep itself informed of 
the potential legal and business risks facing the corporation. Fur-
thermore, the types of business risk that this Article suggests should 
be covered by the duty to monitor are those risks which might 
threaten the solvency of the corporation or otherwise prevent the 
corporation from continuing as a going concern. The duty to monitor 
does not require courts to replace boards. Instead, courts should only 
                                                                                                                  
 149. One would need to be careful to avoid the problem of overcommitment where a 
board would resist recognizing evidence that their initial decision may have been wrong. 
See Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 811. 
 150. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the 
Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1994) 
(noting that hindsight tends to make harmful outcomes seem more foreseeable). 
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consider the procedures pursuant to which the board acted to keep 
itself informed and evaluate any response by the board to red flags. 
 A second concern is that a more robust duty to monitor would sub-
stantially increase the amount of potential personal liability directors 
will face. It is easy to recall the howls of protest from corporate direc-
tors across the United States that followed Smith v. Van Gorkom
when the Delaware Supreme Court decided that the Trans Union 
board members breached their duty of care.151 Greater liability pro-
duces two unwelcome outcomes. First, boards will become overly cau-
tious and avoid the taking of risks that benefit shareholders—
shareholders whose appetite for risk is actually greater because of 
their ability to diversify risk across a portfolio of companies.152 Se-
cond, the higher threat of liability will deter qualified candidates 
from agreeing to serve on boards.153
 It is difficult to refute entirely these concerns in the abstract. It is 
possible that there may be risk averse directors who will overreact to 
the possibility of liability and act in the manner stated above.154 But 
the relevant path of inquiry should be whether the duty to monitor 
suggested in this Article would require directors to do anything more 
than what shareholders would require them to do anyway. In other 
words, it is not clear that the actual amount of personal liability 
faced by a director would require a greater amount of effort than 
what a diligent director already expends. Even in its strongest form, 
the duty to monitor requires boards to invest in internal control and 
information reporting systems that would collect and deliver infor-
mation about possible legal and business risks. The standard sug-
gested by this Article continues to follow the Caremark standard that 
the board’s duty is to attempt in good faith to have a reasonable in-
formation reporting system in place. As Chancellor Allen indicated, 
and this Article agrees, this standard is not a difficult one for direc-
tors to meet and should not deter any qualified director from serving 
on a board.155 The second part of the standard is the burden on the 
board if such systems do report business and legal risks. The burden 
                                                                                                                  
 151. See Leo Strine, Lawrence Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey Gorris, Loy-
alty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law 41-44 (Widener 
U. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 09-13, Harvard U. Sch. of Law, Discussion Paper No. 
630, Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349971. 
 152. See Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Management, supra note 77, at 21-24; Veasey, 
supra note 59, at 2185. 
 153. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2006). 
 154. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 823-25 
(arguing that corporate executives often have an incorrect impression of the actual risk of 
liability and overestimate such risk); Veasey, supra note 59, at 2186. 
 155. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).  
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is actually extremely modest. So long as the board is willing to con-
sider in good faith the relevant risks, it has met the burden.  
 If the duty to monitor does drive away certain persons from serv-
ing on boards, overall, this effect may be a desirable one. Those per-
sons who will be most sensitive to the demands of the duty to monitor 
will be those who either lack the qualifications to carry out the neces-
sary monitoring responsibilities or who cannot devote the additional 
time and other resources demanded by a stronger duty to monitor. 
Citigroup’s call for director candidates with experience in finance and 
investments was an admission that its board lacked the necessary 
expertise to effectively understand the firm’s risk.156 It is also reason-
able to assume that boards that permit certain harm to the corpora-
tion to occur as a result of their complacency are often composed of 
persons who lack the time, interest, or motivation to fulfill their ap-
propriate oversight role. If the effect of a more robust duty to monitor 
is that such persons do not wish to serve on boards, then we should 
applaud the end result. 
 A third concern is that the duty to monitor, as advocated in this 
Article, will usurp the board’s discretion in determining the appro-
priate degree of monitoring and inhibit risk-taking. We do not want 
the duty to monitor to prevent corporations from conducting certain 
activities that may actually benefit the company and its sharehold-
ers.157 In other words, the board may conclude it is in the best inter-
est of the corporation for it to expose itself to extreme amounts of 
business risk.158 Furthermore, the board should decide on its own 
how much it wishes to invest in an internal control and information 
reporting system.159 Such systems are expensive in both management 
and employee time and money.160 Thus, boards should be permitted 
to limit their investment in internal control and information report-
ing systems if they conclude that corporate resources would be better 
spent elsewhere.  
 With respect to the first part of the concern, the ability of the 
board to decide on the level of risk it wishes to assume remains un-
touched. In fact, boards will have more flexibility to decide on the ap-
                                                                                                                  
 156. Citigroup Director Search, supra note 86 (advertising that “the Board is actively seek-
ing new directors who meet the criteria . . . with a particular emphasis on expertise in finance 
and investments”); see also Eric Dash, Dean of Harvard Business School May Join Citigroup’s 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C2 (noting that none of Citigroup’s independent directors, 
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 157. See CLARK, supra note 39, at 132-33. 
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 160. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 93-100 (2002). It was estimated that 
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propriate level of business risk than they currently have in deciding 
when it is acceptable for the company to take on legal risk given the 
prohibition against the conduct of illegal activities by a corporation.161
The more serious criticism is that the duty to monitor prevents 
boards from deciding how much they wish to invest in monitoring 
systems. This criticism is valid. A more robust duty to monitor would 
require directors to put into place more extensive information report-
ing systems to detect possible legal violations, ensure the accuracy of 
financial information, and manage business risk. But the power of 
this criticism assumes that boards in the current environment al-
ready invest the optimal amount in monitoring systems. If we believe 
that boards, in the absence of an effective duty to monitor, generally 
under-invest in monitoring systems, then the revised standard may 
be correcting erroneous practice.162 The fact is that we do not have 
evidence to know if the types of systems required to meet a tougher 
duty to monitor actually represent an appropriate level of investment 
or an over-investment in such systems. As noted by this Article, a 
duty to monitor including business risk tracks accepted risk man-
agement practice in large U.S. public companies. 
 The fourth concern is that the duty to monitor is unnecessary. 
Shareholders do not need the protection afforded by the duty to mon-
itor, as they can protect themselves through owning a diversified 
portfolio of investments or exiting from companies that they feel are 
improperly managed. Alternatively, shareholders can ensure efficient 
director oversight through their power to elect members of the board. 
The strength of such criticism depends on how much faith one puts in 
the ability of shareholders to collect the information needed to re-
balance their investment portfolios appropriately and influence the 
corporation’s governance. By all accounts, one would have to be quite 
optimistic to believe that shareholders can protect themselves suffi-
ciently without the assistance of fiduciary duties, such as a duty to 
monitor. The duty to monitor is partially based upon the belief that 
directors will not have the necessary information to conduct appro-
priate oversight without the implementation of a reasonable monitor-
ing system. If this assumption is correct, it is highly unlikely that 
                                                                                                                  
 161. See, e.g., Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854 
A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Under Delaware law, a fiduciary may not choose to manage 
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shareholders will be on equal footing to make the appropriate evalua-
tions. And in order to give shareholders the necessary information 
there would need to be additional requirements through federal secu-
rities law.163 Furthermore, shareholders, especially diverse share-
holders of public companies, have difficulty exerting influence on 
management.164 Many of the corporate governance initiatives in 
vogue today are attempting to give shareholders a bigger voice in the 
management of the corporation, but it would be a mistake to assume 
that the board should not serve as the primary monitor of the  
corporation’s activities.  
V.   DUTY TO MONITOR’S EFFECT ON DIRECTOR BEHAVIOR: DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY AND CORPORATE NORMS
 What is the point of making the duty to monitor more robust if 
directors never face out-of-pocket liability? The fact that outside di-
rectors almost always escape personal liability for fiduciary breaches 
overshadows any proposal to intensify fiduciary obligations. Dela-
ware, like most states, offers a variety of mechanisms to shield direc-
tors from personal liability and having to pay out-of-pocket expenses. 
Section 102(b)(7) allows corporations to exculpate directors’ liability 
for duty of care violations.165 Section 145 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law permits corporations to indemnify directors for all 
settlements or judgments and cover their legal expenses.166 Section 
145 also empowers corporations to purchase directors’ and officers’ 
(D&O) insurance for its board members.167 Unlike section 102(b)(7) 
exculpation and indemnification, there are no statutory limits on the 
coverage of D&O insurance. Even though the terms of most policies 
will not cover insurance claims for suits based upon deliberate fraud 
or personal profit, these exclusions are narrower than the good faith 
                                                                                                                  
 163. See Sale, Independent Directors, supra note 68, at 1380 (noting that the absence of 
substantive state review has led to reliance on federal securities law, the need for addition-
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 165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010). 
 166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2010). Indemnification is conditioned on directors 
having acted in good faith and “in a manner [they] reasonably believed to be in or not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation.” Id. § 145(a). 
 167. Id. § 145(g). 
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exclusions under section 102(b)(7) and indemnification.168 The fact of 
the matter is that a well-designed D&O insurance policy will cover 
all damages or settlement payments resulting from an action against 
a director for violating her duty to monitor. Given that almost all 
public companies pay for D&O insurance, directors have little to fear 
for their personal wealth from violating their duty to monitor.  
 In their seminal and exhaustive study of outside director liability, 
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner scoured almost 
4000 cases and several hundred settlements and judgments and 
found that the risk of personal liability to outside directors is effec-
tively nonexistent.169 Black, et al. found only thirteen cases where 
directors of public companies had to make personal payments (either 
as part of judgments or settlements) in the course of twenty-five 
years (1980-2005) of securities class action suits, SEC enforcement 
actions, and shareholder derivative suits.170 Only three of the thir-
teen cases pertained to fiduciary duty breaches.171 Significantly, per-
sonal liability in almost all of these cases would have been avoided 
with properly designed D&O insurance policies. 
 The absence of personal liability raises legitimate questions about 
the purpose of imposing on boards more demanding fiduciary duties. 
More robust duties may increase the likelihood of lawsuits, but even 
then directors will remain untouched. In the meantime, corporations 
will bear the cost of litigation, settlements, judgments, and D&O  
insurance premiums.  
 Focusing on out-of-pocket payments, however, understates the 
case for how recognizing a more robust duty to monitor will change 
director behavior. When accused of fiduciary breaches, directors face 
costs that go beyond their direct pecuniary interests. Most obviously, 
directors bear the nuisance of having to participate in legal proceed-
ings, especially the commitment of personal time. The more signifi-
cant cost, however, is to a director’s reputation. If the claim is suc-
cessful, the director may be forced to resign or fail to be re-elected at 
the next board election.172 In addition, the continuing presence of di-
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2011] RETHINKING THE BOARD’S DUTY TO MONITOR 247
rectors who have been sued also increases the probability of future 
lawsuits as these directors develop a reputation for being weak moni-
tors.173 A successful claim also makes a director less attractive as a 
candidate to serve on other boards. In outlining their theory on the 
separation of ownership and control, Eugene Fama and Michael Jen-
sen described a market for outside directors where outside directors 
compete for open board positions.174 More respected directors would 
receive more board invitations. Therefore, serving on multiple boards 
would be a marker of the director’s quality and prestige. Several 
studies support the existence of this market, finding a correlation 
between corporate performance and additional board seats.175 The 
study by Fich and Shivdasani, for example, found that outside direc-
tors experience a significant decline in the number of opportunities to 
join other boards after the discovery of financial fraud.176 Outside di-
rectors face an especially strong reputational hit because they bear 
greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Consequently, reputa-
tional costs are real, and directors have the incentive to meet their 
fiduciary obligations to the fullest extent possible. 
 Delaware courts’ ability to change board behavior, however, does 
not come only from its power to mete out punishment. It also comes 
from their power to define and change prevailing corporate govern-
ance norms. Judges achieve this through detailed commentary in 
their judicial opinions, speeches, and articles about the expected du-
ties and responsibilities of directors and officers—what Claire Hill 
and Brett McDonnell have called the “penumbra of Delaware corpo-
rate law.”177 Delaware judges’ influence on U.S. corporate law is high 
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because they frequently interact with the bar and are not shy to pro-
vide guidance on expected corporate governance practices.178 These 
pronouncements, and the responses from the bar, shareholder activ-
ists, academics, and corporate leaders, produce a rich body of com-
mentary that help shape the legal and business community’s under-
standing of best practices of corporate governance.179 It also is a 
means by which Delaware courts can clarify the meaning of various 
legal standards, including the scope and application of the duty to 
monitor.  
 These norms in turn affect the culture of the corporate board. 
Greater exhortations from Delaware courts for boards to engage in 
more robust monitoring of business risks and the implementation of 
past business decisions will shape the composition of boards and how 
boards go about their business. Board nominating committees will 
search for directors who have good reputations as monitors and pos-
sess relevant expertise and qualifications. Directors themselves will 
adjust their own expectations regarding the amount of time and effort 
they will need to spend on their positions. D&O insurance providers, 
who keenly observe the culture of corporate boards, will note changes 
and may reward the more proactive boards with lower D&O insurance 
premiums.180 Thus, it is within the Delaware courts’ power to make 
meaningful changes in how boards fulfill their duty to monitor. 
VI.   CONCLUSION
 Risk management is a corporate governance problem. Officers and 
employees of the corporation make decisions every day that put the 
corporation at risk. A careful balance must be struck between en-
couraging risk-taking by these officers and employees—to take 
chances to grow the business and exploit new opportunities—and the 
need for control and supervision to ensure that risks are taken in an 
appropriate and reasoned manner. The recent catastrophic losses suf-
fered by our large financial institutions remind us that there are 
downside risks that need to be managed and spur us to ask whether 
our corporate governance laws have struck the right balance.  
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 Courts, especially the Delaware courts, play a crucial role in ad-
justing this balance. Courts need to be more aware of the expecta-
tions of shareholders, regulators, and even the directors themselves 
about how risks should be taken and managed. Courts should study 
the director-officer relationship and recognize how important it is for 
boards to make the effort to collect the right type of information 
about the corporation and be prepared to second-guess the risk per-
ceptions of the officers.181 Strengthening the fiduciary duty to monitor 
is crucial to this task.182 The board’s duty to monitor should be espe-
cially great when the corporation takes risks that may threaten its 
survival. Often these are the times when the CEO is most likely to 
take extreme risks to the detriment of the enterprise.183
 It must be noted that if Delaware courts do nothing and the duty 
to monitor continues to languish, the federal government will likely 
fill the void, imposing new rules to force boards to be better informed 
and manage business risks.184 Already in most areas of corporate law, 
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federal law has imposed more stringent requirements on public com-
panies than those set by state courts and legislatures, preempting in 
many cases the applicability of state corporate law.185 Delaware has 
an interest in ensuring that it protects its role as the leading corpo-
rate law jurisdiction and take the lead on defining a meaningful  
monitoring duty.186
 Fortunately, Delaware courts have tremendous influence over 
prevailing corporate governance practices. Opinions and commentary 
by judges develop and define norms and best practices that affect di-
rector behavior, often more so than the threat of legal liability. 
Courts now should begin speaking out about the importance of a 
board’s duty to monitor and to back up their exhortations by expand-
ing the scope and application of the duty in future cases.  
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